One Kind of Response to Divine Hiddenness (and a list of others, too)

Comments due by 11:59pm Sunday (November 3, 2013).

We've been considering the matter of divine hiddenness in class. In particular, we have been considering Schellenberg's arguments from divine hiddenness to atheism.

There's a fairly large literature on the matter of divine hiddenness. But here's one theistic response to the issue. Christian philosopher Michael Murray offers a free will response to divine hiddenness. In short, he argues that God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.

Here's Murray:

"My claim is that the hiddenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat [of eternal hell given disobedience to the divine will] implied by knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional Christian story. If God revealed his existence in a more perspicuous fashion we would be in a situation very much like the one in the standard robbery case, i.e., strong threat strength and strong threat imminence such that the level of wantonness [i.e., a characteristic of the individual threatened to disregard personal well-being in the face of threats to his freedom] of most, if not all, individuals would not significantly diminish their feeling compelled to act in accordance with the demand of the threatener. However, if God desires that there be individuals with free will who can use it in morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God."

Consider the merits of Murray's response. (You may have to stew over it a while to understand it.) Is Murray on to something here? Is he right about this? Would Schellenberg have a plausible reply to Murray?

C.S. Lewis seems to offer the same sort of reply in his The Screwtape Letters. Here's how Lewis puts the point (from the mouth of a demon mentoring a subordinate demon). 

"You must have often wondered why the enemy [God] does not make more use of his power to be sensibly present to human souls in any degree he chooses and at any moment. But you now see that the irresistible and the indisputable are the two weapons which the very nature of his scheme forbids him to use. Merely to over-ride a human will (as his felt presence in any but the faintest and most mitigated degree would certainly do) would be for him useless. He cannot ravish. He can only woo. For his ignoble idea is to eat the cake and have it; the creatures are to be one with him, but yet themselves; merely to cancel them, or assimilate them, will not serve.... Sooner or later he withdraws, if not in fact, at least from their conscious experience, all supports and incentives. He leaves the creature to stand up on its own legs--to carry out from the will alone duties which have lost all relish.... He cannot "tempt" to virtue as we do to vice. He wants them to learn to walk and must therefore take away his hand.... Our cause is never more in danger than when a human, no longer desiring, but still intending, to do our enemy's will, looks round upon a universe from which every trace of him seems to have vanished, and asks why he has been forsaken, and still obeys."

Perhaps Murray's (and Lewis') reply does not satisfy. There are other sorts of replies. The following list of responses come from Christian philosophers Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser (from the Introduction to their edited book Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press (2002)).

God hides and thus permits reasonable nonbelief...

1. in order to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey Him; otherwise, we would be coerced in a manner incompatible with love. [This seems to be Murray's response.]

2. in order to prevent a human response based on improper motives (such as fear of punishment). [This seems to be a part of Murray's response, too.]

3. because, if He were not hidden, humans would relate to God and to their knowledge of God in presumptuous ways and the possibility of developing the inner attitudes essential to a proper relationship with Him would be ipso facto ruled out.

4. because this hiding prompts us to recognize the wretchedness of life on our own, without God, and thereby stimulates us to search for him contritely and humbly.

5. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, then the sense of risk required for a passionate faith would be objectionably reduced.

6. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, temptation to doubt His existence would not be possible, religious diversity would be objectionably reduced, and believers would not have as much opportunity to assist others in starting personal relationships with God.

7. and there's a good reason why God hides, but we don't know what that reason is, and we have no grounds for thinking that we would know what that reason is (since we are finite, cognitively limited people), so there's no basis for an objection to God's existence here.

Maybe one (or the conjunction of two or more) of these explanations succeeds in countering Schellenberg's arguments. Which of these explanations would you offer (if any)? Do you think one (or more) of them succeeds to counter Schellenberg's arguments? If so, which one(s), and what premise (in each argument--Analogy and Conceptual) is denied? If you have a different explanation for divine hiddenness, what is it?

Be sure to interact with each other. Again, take advantage of these opportunities to have these directed, focused conversations.

Fideism and the Extremist Brain

Comments due by 11:59pm Tuesday, October 1.

This week we started considering fideism, looking at how it might be characterized and why one might be attracted to such a view on faith and reason issues.

Consider this article, and accompanying TED talk located just above the article, by Diane Benscoter. She discusses religious extremism and the brain. She relays her own experiences with a religious cult. She wonders how she got duped.

Relate what she has to say here to fideism. Do her story and corresponding reflections raise any worries for fideism?

Interact with each other and challenge each other. Get after the issues and learn from one another. As always, be gracious, charitable, and humble.

Peter van Inwagen on the Role of Philosophy in Religion

Comments due by 11:59pm Sunday (9/15).

We have been discussing in class faith and reason issues. In particular, we have been considering together whether the cognitive component of religious faith--one's religious beliefs--are subject to some rational standard and, if so, what that standard might be.

In this video interview, prominent Christian philosopher Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame) discusses whether philosophy can illuminate religious belief, whether philosophy has anything helpful to say regarding say religious belief.

What do you make of van Inwagen's claims here? Is he right about the role or function of philosophy with respect to religious belief?

As always, be sure to challenge and push one another. Take advantage of this opportunity to think together in community, to cultivate good habits of thinking and the practice of sustained reflection upon matters of incredible significance. And be sure to be gracious, charitable, and humble throughout. 
 

McGrath, Wierenga, and Schellenberg on Faith and Reason

Comments due by 11:59pm this Sunday (9/8).

In class we are moving to consider the relationship between faith and reason.Certainly we hear quite a lot about faith and the importance (or danger) of faith. We hear from some that faith and reason are at odds, that faith is best conceived of as something like belief in the absence of, or even opposed to, the evidence. Others seem to think that faith can be quite reasonable or rational, and they then offer us reasons for thinking that the content of their faith is true.

How are we to think about such things?

To help us toward that end, let's consider three brief interviews on the topic of faith and reason. First, here's an interview with Alister McGrath (Professor of Theology at King's College, London).

Second, here's an interview with Ed Wierenga (Professor of Philosophy and of Religion at the University of Rochester).

Third, and finally, here's an interview with J.L. Schellenberg (Professor of Philosophy at Mount Saint Vincent University).

There's certainly a lot to think about here in all of these interviews. Which claims struck you in each video? Which arguments did you find compelling? What objections might you have to some of the positions advanced? Were there some common themes found in each video? If so, what are those themes? After watching these videos, has your view of the relationship between faith and reason changed any? How so? How do you now think about faith and reason (even if your view did not change upon watching the videos)?

Push each other. Challenge each other. Demand reasons and arguments. Offer arguments. Raise objections. Ask questions. Learn from each other. And, as always, do so in a way that is gracious, charitable, and humble.

John Cottingham on Causes of Religious Belief

Comments due by 11:59pm this Sunday (9/1). 

In class we have been considering both religious realism and nonrealism. We've looked at a nonrealist sociological analysis of religion that seemingly attempts to show that religion is essentially a social phenomenon.

Here I want you to consider an interview with prominent philosopher John Cottingham.The video can be found here.

Consider what Cottingham has to say about various evolutionary and/or psychoanalytical explanations for religious belief. Do you find his replies plausible? Do they succeed? If not, why not? Do they apply equally forcefully (or fare just as badly) to sociological analyses of the causes of religious belief? Why or why not? What questions occurred to you as you listened to Cottingham? How might he respond to those questions? Any objections?

Take advantage of this opportunity to engage in good critical conversation with others. Consider carefully what others are saying, and press and challenge each other. Demand arguments and reasons. Ask questions. But always do so with grace, charity, and humility.

Welcome!

This is the course blog for Philosophy of Religion.

My hope is that each of you will participate thoughtfully and graciously in the conversations on this blog. The topics addressed in this course are crucial to a robust understanding of religious commitment. Consequently, we may be unwilling to consider carefully and charitably views that are different from our own or to take seriously objections to our beliefs.

This is unfortunate and tragic.

I should hope that on this blog we practice listening carefully to each other, expressing clearly and carefully our positions, and handling graciously criticisms raised against our beliefs. Doing so should help us all think harder and better about religion/religious belief in addition to thinking harder and better about who we are and how we are to engage the world.

I look forward to joining in conversation with each of you!